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2Urban regeneration: from the arts ‘feel good’ factor to 
the cultural economy. A case study of Hoxton, 
London.
‘Here lives a population as dull and unimaginative as its long grey miles of 
dingy brick’ (Jack London, 1905)
Introduction
0
This paper contributes to debates about the trajectories of post-industrial urban 
economies in the global ‘North’. Specifically, it seeks to critically examine the role of 
culture in the continued development, or regeneration, of ‘post-industrial’ cities. The 
paper is critical on two points of the existing literature. First, it is critical of 
instrumental conceptions of culture with regard to urban regeneration.  Second, it is 
critical of the adequacy of the conceptual framework of ‘post-industrial city’ (and the 
‘service sector’) as an adequate basis for the understanding and explanation of the rise 
of the cultural industries in cities. The paper is based upon a case study of the 
transformation of a classic, and in policy debates a seminal, ‘cultural quarter’: Hoxton 
Square, North London. Hoxton, and many areas like it i, are commonly presented as 
derelict parts of cities, which many claim have though a ‘magical’ injection of culture, 
0 0
been transformed into dynamic destinations. The paper suggests a more complex and 
multi-faceted causality based upon a robust concept of the cultural industries qua 
industry rather than as consumption.
Cities of the global ‘North’ have experienced a dramatic shift away from their 
0
economic base in manufacturing and distribution to service orientated activities, 
0
notably banking, finance and insurance, and management consultancies. The fact that 
manufacturing jobs have declined, and moved away, has led to a relative and then 
absolute domination of service activities. However, it has also led to unemployment 
and migration of former manufacturing workers, and in-migration, or inward 
commuting, of service sector workers. For example, London lost as many  jobs to 
manufacturing as it gained in financial services in the 1980s (Pratt, 1994). As a 
consequence one built environment generally has been replaced by another more 
suited to these new activities. However, such a transformation seldom occurs in the 
same location and hence leads to both new building and dereliction (Pratt and Ball, 
1993). However, such transitions are seldom easy or smooth; economic, social and 
cultural communities are disrupted and transformed in the process creating a new 
permutation of advantaged and disadvantaged.  A number of very interesting 
transformations have been occurring in some cities where cultural industries have 
occupied and re-used old industrial premises (Hutton, 2000; Hutton, 2004; O'Connor 
et al., 2000); it is this issue, and in particular the activities that drive this desire for 
location in the city, that this paper will examine.
0
3In policy  terms, urban agencies have increasingly focused on the attraction of inward 
investment; the terms of such a competitive strategy have been cheap land, or 
employees, and advertising (Short and Kim, 1998) commonly based upon desirable 
attributes (commonly represented by  ‘Quality of Life’ indicators). The latest theme of 
such regeneration has been ‘culture’, this has two dimensions: the first concerns the 
construction of mainly  high culture facilities to make a city ‘attractive’  or simply 
0
‘well known’ (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Paddison, 1993); the second concerns 
what has been termed the ‘experience economy’ where visitors and investors are 
drawn into unique place-based experiences either of a heritage or retail variety 
(Harvey, 1989; Pine II and Gilmore, 1999). This latter dimension has been elaborated 
0
upon by  Florida in his discussion of the ‘environments’ (physical and institutional) 
that attract the ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2004).  A further debate is that of ‘cultural 
clusters’, whilst there is much confusion within this debate much of it focuses on 
consumption practices (Mommaas, 2004); the dimension of the productive and 
economic potential of culture has received less attention from academics and policy 
makers (Scott, 2000). This paper argues that this line of debate offers considerable 
insight into contemporary (cultural) urban regeneration.
Specifically, this paper challenges the consumption characterisation of culture : the 
0
notion that culture cannot be planned, and, the instrumental role assigned culture. In 
its place it underlines a production focus for culture, the potential for cultural strategy, 
and the possibility of developing culture on its own terms. Before exploring this 
debate and a case study this paper reviews some of what might be regarded as 
0
unsound foundations commonly used for understanding the role of the cultural 
economy in urban areas.
Some shaky foundations of the urban cultural economy
0
In this section I want to briefly review and set up for examination six thematic 
arguments that are commonly deployed to account for the role of culture in urban 
regeneration. It is not the aim of this paper to offer an extensive review of the 
literature in this field, that would take a whole paper itself, the aim here is simply to 
identify the key  parameters of argumentation to contextualise the empirical part of the 
paper. These notions are commonly  implicated in debates about the emergence of 
post-industrial cities. I will to argue that these arguments are neither internally 
0 0 0 0
coherent with relationship to culture, nor, that they are mutually in compatible. 
Whilst one may describe a city as ‘post-industrial’ if the employment of 
manufacturing is significantly less, and declining, compared to services, I take issue 
with the very conceptual division of manufacture and services upon which this 
debates is founded. In this sense the term ‘neo-industrial’ is perhaps more accurate; 
that is in the sense of project intensive organisational forms (Ekstedt, 1999), but also, 
in terms of a hybrid service and manufacture activity (Walker, 1985).
It is difficult  to evaluate actually existing ‘cultural’ policies adequately  as in most 
cases they neither have singular nor coherent objectives in relation to either cultural 
4production or to cultural excellenceii. For example, the dominant mode in which they 
have been developed in the UK has been as a means of facilitating social inclusion, 
alongside a traditional core provision of a proscribed public supported culture. There 
are some exceptions at the urban level in terms of developing cultural economic 
sector policies. As I will note, Hoxton offers a typical experience in that what public 
investment has occurred there, and has benefited cultural production, has either been 
serendipitous. The discussion in this paper suggests that culture does play a role, and 
could play an even bigger one, in regeneration if it was addressed properly.
0 0
In short, I want to counter the laissez-faire and a-causal notion of cultural regeneration 
that can best characterised as ‘light the blue touch paper and retire’. The problem, for 
0
the cultural industries, is that they  briefly ‘shine and burn’. Out of the ashes arises 
0
residential development with precious little redistribution, or spread effect, and little 
0
space or opportunity for cultural producers. In fact, as this paper will show, the 
common result is the expulsion of the cultural industries from such locales. I would 
argue that  cities are wasting what are currently one of the most dynamic industries as 
0
‘starter fuel’ for property development and residential expansion when the cultural 
0
industries could be used to develop more substantial economic and cultural agendas.
A second theme, that is part and parcel of regeneration debates, concerns 
gentrification. The dominant accounts of gentrification point to a combination of a 
‘rent-gap’ thesis and a cultural particularity (Lees, 2000, 2003); as well as 
embeddedness in temporal and institutional specificities such as tenure patterns and 
the age of the built environment. Gentrification  debates have almost exclusively been 
concerned with residential-to-residential conversion of property. However, a 
characteristic of regeneration is the shift between commercial uses, and a shift from 
commercial to residential usage (the exception is Zukin, 1982). One objective of this 
0 0
paper is to highlight the process of industrial gentrification: either industrial-to-
industrial uses, or industrial-to-residential uses.
Third, there are a set of debates that stress the role of the representation of cities and 
the way  that this links into place-based competition for inward investment (Hall and 
Hubbard, 1998; Kearns and Philo, 1993). Notions of ‘culture’ have been figured in 
these debates in two ways: first, as material and immaterial heritage uniquely linked 
to place, this allows cities to develop their own unique selling position; second, 
through the creation of new infrastructures, or new practices, that are become 
associated with a place and hence a create a unique experience. Moreover, there are 
various ways of simply  talking up cities via quality of life indicators (Rogerson, 
1999). I will offer a contrary perspective here, first of culture as production rather 
than ornament, and second the far more subtle ways that city spaces can be ‘spun’ in 
the media.
Fourth, and related, are debates about the Creative Class. Critically, Florida’s (2002) 
notion is based upon the idea of cultural practices and environments being ‘honey 
pots’ that attract mobile labour, in particular educated mobile labour that will be 
attractive to high-tech industries. So, at base, Florida’s debate is one of supporting 
5cultural consumption (Peck, 2005; Pratt, 2008). This paper highlights the role of 
0
cultural production as well as cultural consumption . I n this case the default 
0 0
assumption of consumption driven development is challenged and replaced by a 
cultural production basis. 
0
Fifth, the global cities literature has discussed the role of the rise of advanced 
producer services (APS). Here the argument is that such services are internationally 
orientated and act as basing points for a global economy, and hence a generator of 
international resource flows to the city and region. However, as Sassen (2001) 
acknowledges , even APS is too coarse an analytical frame. There are subtle 
0
differences within the APS. Moreover, the majority of the literature on APS overlooks 
the cultural industries altogether. Where they are considered the cultural industries (or 
more usually advertising) is seen as derived demand from headquarters functions 
(Beaverstock et al., 2000; Gordon and McCann, 2000). There is an expectation in the 
0
literature that the growth of new media will be related to the FIRE industries and their 
international business; hence, a location of the city  fringe might be expected. 
However, as evidenced by London (GLA_Economics, 2004), the cultural industries 
0
do play  both a significant economic and structural role in the urban economy; the 
question is do the cultural industries behave in the same way as the APS? (for a more 
extensive discussion of this issue see Pratt, 2007). 
0
Sixth, the concept of business clusters has been discussed alongside the idea of 
cultural clusters. Mommaas  (2004) notes that there is much confusion over the use of 
the term cultural cluster in the policy domain, however, the term predominantly  refers 
to public subsidized, consumption and art/heritage based initiatives. Alongside this is 
an argument from an economic and management position, characterised by the work 
of Porter (1995), that explores the economic dimensions clustering. However, the 
question of causality is unclear (Martin and Sunley, 2003). Traditional approaches are 
based on the minimisation of transactions costs (Scott, 2000), however, empirical 
research in both advertising, film and television, computer games and new media 
indicates that the role of social-economic interactions around and across, as well as 
within firms is more important that traded cost interactions or savings (Gornostaeva 
and Pratt, 2006; Grabher, 2001a; Grabher, 2001b, 2002a, b, 2004; Pratt, 2000, 2002, 
2006). Before proceeding to test these six hypotheses, the next section of the paper 
provides a contextual background for the case study of Hoxton.
The case study: Hoxton
0
Methodologies
The case study presented here is based on research supported by a number of funding 
sourcesiii, fieldwork strategies and secondary research. In terms of fieldwork six 
strategies were used: first, participant observation; the author has made regular visits 
to the area over a period of ten years. Second, interviews with key protagonists; the 
6author has directed three projects by students as part of the Programme MSc Cities, 
Space and Society, these projects included interviews with artists, estate agents, 
property  developers, residents and industrialists in the locale (Burwood, 2001; Da 
Silva, 2001; Graham, 2001; Ince, 2001). Third, two graduate dissertations written on 
the locale that also included interviews with key protagonists, and new media 
companies (Harris, 2001; O'Sullivan, 2002). Fourth, interviews with members of the 
0
Hackney  Planning Department, Rennaisai regeneration agency, and City  Fringe 
Partnership. Fifth, interviews with the Lux new media centre (Pratt and Gill, 2000). 
Sixth, interviews with new media workers in Hoxtoniv. Such and approach was 
necessary  given the timescale covered and the range of topics. In addition to the usual 
academic sources, news media and consultancy reports were searched for background 
information and representational data. The detailed methodologies for each strategy 
are to be found in the original reports and references cited above.
Location/Context
Hoxton is located in East Inner London, directly north of the financial centre, ‘the 
0
City’, close to Liverpool Street railway station and the Broadgate redevelopment. The 
area is part of what is termed the ‘City Fringe’, significantly the City Fringe 
Partnership  agency seeks to promote development in the economically depressed area 
around the eastern and northern borders of the City. The ‘City  Fringe’ comprises of a 
0
number of local boroughs and wards, and is overlain with a pepper pot of spatial 
initiatives for regeneration and amelioration of social exclusion. The area ranges from 
Clerkenwell in the North via Hoxton to Brick Lane in the East.
The area commonly referred to as Hoxton is technically  Shoreditch; Hoxton proper, 
with its famous market, lies north of Hoxton Square, which is itself north of Old 
Street. South Shoreditch lies south of Old Street/Hoxton Square. It is also known 
under other names: ‘SoSho’ to estate agents, or the Shoreditch triangle (bounded by 
Old Street, Great Eastern Street and Shoreditch High Street). The ‘Hoxton’ of new 
media and art  fame lies within the space bounded by  Hoxton Square north of Old 
Street, and the Shoreditch triangle south of Old Street. This area is located within a 
complex administrative map albeit just within the borough of Hackney; however, the 
0
eastern side of Shoreditch High Street is Tower Hamlets, West of Old Street is 
Islington, South of the Shoreditch Triangle is the City. The Shoreditch Triangle has an 
0
urban footprint of less than 100 sq.m.
Hoxton has always been ‘on the edge’. Its early good fortune was to be outside the 
regulatory control of The City which led to the location of various ‘undesirable’ 
activities (social, economic and environmental) being located there: from noxious 
manufacturing, to illegal trading and prostitution. As with all such locations Hoxton 
has always been in the shadow of the City , historically  is has been an area of 
0
significant social deprivation.
7The emblematic core of the area is Hoxton Square, a formal city square surrounding a 
patch of grass and bordered by London Plane Trees. Large Victorian warehouses and 
0
former showrooms on major roads dominate the south of the area, with very  small 
alleys/roads containing workshops at the rear. North of Old Street there is a cross 
section of the history of house building in London; from the square through large 
scale Peabody housing blocksv, to GLC and local authority housing blocks from 
virtually every building period in the last century. 
<insert map 1 here: source (Hutton, 2006)>
History
Hoxton’s history  is an example of the consequences of unconstrained growth and 
rapid urbanisation. The massive nineteenth century  Imperial expansion of the City 
0
generated manufacture and trade commonly located in the workshops of Hoxton; it 
was a massive employment generator, attractor of migrants and subject to severe 
overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. The area performs badly in Booth’s classic 
survey of the London poor, a graphic illustration can be found in Jack London’s 
(1905) more colourful reportage:
“No more dreary spectacle can be found on this earth than the whole of the 
"awful East," with its Whitechapel, Hoxton, Spitalfields, Bethnal Green, and 
Wapping to the East India Docks. The colour of life is grey and drab. 
Everything is helpless, hopeless, unrelieved, and dirty. Bath tubs are a thing 
0
totally unknown, as mythical as the ambrosia of the gods. The people 
themselves are dirty, while any attempt at cleanliness becomes howling farce, 
when it is not pitiful and tragic. Strange, vagrant odours come drifting along 
the greasy wind, and the rain, when it falls, is more like grease than water from 
heaven. The very cobblestones are scummed with grease.
Here lives a population as dull and unimaginative as its long grey miles of 
dingy brick. Religion has virtually passed it by, and a gross and stupid 
materialism reigns, fatal alike to the things of the spirit and the finer instincts 
of life.”
If Jack London is to be believed, then this is an inauspicious foundation for what has 
been claimed to be one of the most creative places in the world! The area was bombed 
heavily in the Second World War  and fell further into decline. It was literally  the 
0
home of London’s black/informal market, and the site of the 1960s violent gangland 
turf wars of the Krays and the Richardsonsvi. The re-development of Broad Street and 
0
Liverpool Street stations in the 1980s (what was termed Broadgate) undermined 
potential overspill from the City’s economic activity; more generally  the massive rout 
of London manufacturing was exemplified with the collapse of the furniture and 
8textile industries that had been a staple in this area (Graham and Spence, 1995; Hall, 
1962).
In just  a decade Hoxton achieved almost mythical status as a cultural ‘hot spot’; and, 
arguably, it fizzled out even more quickly. The schematic history is that in the early 
1990s members of what were to become known as the Young British Artists (YBA) 
set up studio and living space in and around Hoxton. This social network extended 
into a number of art  forms, including music as innovators in post-House and Jungle, 
and Brit Pop lived and performed. The area had already been home to studios and 
offices of punk music labels (for example Stiff records). The big draw was cheap  and 
0
large studio space close to London: this ‘arts’ community  entertained and socialised in 
0
its own spaces. Later, Bars and clubs opened; for example, a famous and pioneering 
gay club, the London Apprentice (later ‘333’), was on the corner of Hoxton Square. 
0
The YBA’s socialised in the Bricklayers Arms on Charlotte Street. The Lux cinema, 
an arts cinema and the home of the London Film and Video Workshop, took space in 
Hoxton square and it became a social and artistic hub. 
Hoxton was crowned one of the ‘coolest places on the planet’ by Time Magazine 
(1996), and it was linked to the notion of ‘Cool Britannia’ a theme exploited by  the 
incoming Labour administration in 1997. A new wave of migrants arrived in Hoxton 
in the late 1990s as it  became the epicentre of the new media industry  in the UK. In 
2000, Chris Smith, the first secretary of state of the new Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport who championed the creative industries, launched the ‘Year of the 
Artist’ in Hoxton Square. By this time prices had risen and the last  artists were leaving 
for cheaper space further East, and their spaces were fast being converted into 
residential lofts; the same fortune quickly beset new media in the crash years 
(2000-1). Hoxton became very  trendy, with its own style crusaders and ‘ cultural 
0
wannabes’. Shortly afterwards, the Lux cinema closed because its Arts Council 
funding was not renewed. 
By this time the party  was over and Hoxton became a byword for ‘naff’; it had its 
own hair style ‘a Hoxton Fin’, and its unique character was captured in the TV 
character if ‘Nathan Barley’, and the magazine ‘Shoreditch Twat’vii . Increasingly, 
0
new-build simulacrum lofts and restaurants replaced the old built fabric.  Beyond the 
cruel twists of fashion new media and some cutting edge advertising still exists along 
side an increasingly upmarket and residential consumption space that increasingly 
serves as a ‘pied a terre’ for the City. North of the square, Hoxton proper is as poor as 
it ever was and the jobs that used to provide a livelihood, and a reason to go south of 
the square, were gone for good.
Despite the attempts of numerous regeneration schemes little has lifted the fortunes of 
Hoxton; and, despite the massive cultural boost, even today it is still one of the 
poorest wards in London: 11th out of 624 (GLA, 2005). This fact may seem surprising 
0 0
given that Hoxton is known the world over as both a by-word for ‘cool’ and is 
commonly cited as a paradigmatic example of culture-led regeneration. The remainder 
9of this paper seeks to explain what happened in order to help to understand why the 
‘regeneration’ of Hoxton has, at best, been partial.
Six themes of interpretation
0
In this section of the paper I want to reflect  back on the initial hypotheses and to 
evaluate as to what extent they  have explanatory purchase on Hoxton’s development. 
Whilst the existence of cheap rents (early in the period under study) and proximity to 
the City are suggestive, they  do not explain why Hoxton has turned out as it has (there 
are many other ‘cheap’ areas close by), nor do they  explain how and why 
development followed the course it did; and, a topic I will return to in the conclusion, 
if there is any indication that such a process might be repeatable elsewhere.
Cultural and planning policy 
Hoxton has not been the subject of a cultural strategy, nor a cultural planning policy; 
what development that has occurred has been generally ad hoc and uncoordinated. 
This in itself is not a dismissal of policy per se; rather, it is to point out  that public 
policy has seldom engaged with commercial cultural production, let  along a hybrid of 
0
commercial and public initiatives. Much of Hoxton’s development pre-dates the 
creative industries initiative of the Labour government, and, Hoxton was not part of 
0
the GLC’s cultural industries initiative that inspired much of the cultural and creative 
industries policies that followed in the UK and elsewhere. Hoxton does appear in the 
0
GLC’s industrial strategy, but under the section on the declining furniture industry 
(Best, 1990).
As was common at the time, the only  area of policy that had an impact on the nascent 
cultural cluster was planning policy. Planning and regeneration thus provides the 
focus, culture is almost entirely overlooked. Shoreditch is located in Hackney, and 
historically this area has been viewed in a hopeful light as a strategic bridge between 
the City and the poorer North London hinterland. A core argument behind the 
industrial land use zoning that continued until the late 1980s was the fear that 
industrial users would be out-bid by office users if strict  land use zoning polices were 
relaxed. However, the industrial decline of the late 1970s and early  1980s saw 3,000 
jobs lost in South Shoreditch (78-83). The planning liberalisation represented by  the 
1987 Use Classes Order did not bring immediate change, or the predicted office 
takeover. Some land assembly was proposed, but little real change occurred. 
However, the general liberalisation of planning clearly facilitated the cultural changes 
afoot, as they were mixed and not industrial uses.
As if the complex local administrative boundaries (see Maps 1 and 2) were not 
complex enough, the slew of initiatives that constitute urban regeneration policies 
further muddle the situation. As we can see from map the area falls within: European 
Urban Area, New Deal for Shoreditch, EU (European Union) Objective 2 business 
10
opportunity area, Haggerston SRB (Single Regeneration Budget); and City Challenge; 
and laying within City Fringe. 
<map 2 here>
Regeneration funding began to be targeted on the area in the early 1990s (1992 City 
Challenge £37.2m), the objective to create a Dalston Corridor; the Old Street Gateway 
0 0
was to be the ‘entrance’. This money, plus the later Objective 2 ERDF (European 
0
Regional Development Fund) status, and Lottery funding, released resources for 
institutions to refurbish buildings in the area (for example the Blue Lux, English 
National Opera, and Circus Space); however, these projects were generally focused on 
institutions and on providing training or exhibition resources in the area  targeted at 
0
the wider city rather than as a response to demand from local residents. 
0
Gentrification
The practice of property development is in essence simple: buy cheap  and sell 
expensive. However, the problem is the risk, and cost, of money borrowed  in the 
0
interim. The classic ‘rent-gap’ theory of gentrification expresses a version of this 
whereby landlords minimise their risks of investment by  delaying refurbishment as 
long as possible, then catching a rising market. However, whilst the economic 
processes are similar, gentrification theory is based upon residential markets. Zukin’s 
(1982) research on the Soho (New York) loft market  is a lone exception, and tellingly, 
0
outlines a subtler story about the interface of economy and culture, and pointed to the 
importance of ‘taste’ of the residential incomers, and the impact  on non-residential 
users. 
Whilst there has been a cultural turn in the gentrification literature it fails to engage 
with Zukin’s point (which she states as an afterthought in the preface to the British 
edition of her book) that the creation of a habitus sustained by working artists is the 
key attractor and differentiator in loft  developments. A closer reading of Zukin (1982) 
0
does suggest that that habitus is perhaps sometimes better considered as a driver of 
change (as cheap property  can be found in many places)viii. It would require a more 
0
extensive paper on this point alone to do this justice, suffice to say here  the 
0
manipulation of taste and the exploitation or marketing of styles is the key skill of 
estate agents and property developers. Moreover, there are a number of points of 
confluence and conflict of interest between the various agencies involved. The next 
part of this section takes this point a step further and looks at wider media 
representations in ‘talking up’ the area. Before this, I will describe the processes as 
they occurred in Hoxton.
An element that reduced the risk for developers and enabled the informal mixed use 
activity was the reform of the Use Classes Order (UCO). Essentially this relaxed 
restrictions of permitted use of buildings and in effect  facilitate what had previously 
been planned and zoned as light manufacturing to be in actual fact mixed use, artist 
11
studios and eventually  plain residential. In a remarkable rear guard action to avoid 
what was feared to be mass demolition of Shoreditch the planning authority declared 
the whole a Conservation Area in 1986. However, the impact of laissez-faire 
regulation did not happen (in the way expected); for example, Hackney had hoped to 
sell off a corner of Hoxton Square in the late 1980s, but the market slumped. In 
retrospect Hackney were completely wrong footed by  what happened in Hoxton. 
Planning policy  was focused on the Dalston corridor, linking with the City and hoping 
to draw economic development north. Although Hoxton was not  really  the focus of 
this initiative, zoning did create access to grant funding.
0
In Hoxton it was not estate agents that  created the market, rather an ex-Royal College 
of Arts sculptor, David Nicholsonix. In Zukin’s terms Nicholson understood and 
promoted the habitus of the artist. His company Glasshouse Investments bought 
studio space in the early 1990s in Charlotte St, then Hoxton Square and Coronet 
Streetx. Glasshouse worked with Hackney  and the British Film Institute to leverage 
public sector funding for the Lux cinema that, later, was to become a magnet for 
cultural entrepreneurs in the locale. At this time it  was an extremely risky  venture, but 
like other property entrepreneurs, he targeted artistsxi. As one estate agent commented 
at the time regarding the potential for the market in the area,
“Nobody wanted to be here, there was…drugs, it had a real bad reputation…
shootings, and…a few crimes happening there on a regular basis”(Harris, 2001)
Glasshouse sponsored Compston’s Factual Nonsense (see below) to use Hoxton 
Square for the Fete worse than Death 2 (1994), Nicholson clearly saw a way of 
drumming up  business amongst artists for his lofts. The baton was passed to Sterling 
Ackroyd for The Hanging Picnic (1995). The estate agents Sterling Ackroyd have 
played a dominant role in the property market in Shoreditch in the late 1990s, moved 
to a new office in the triangle in 1998. Without a doubt the property developers 
eventually successfully leveraged both Compstons’ and the YBA cultural assets. 
Whilst Compston was a pioneer he was not  the first to get into property; the prize for 
that goes to SPACE. Initially set up in London by the artist  Bridget Riley in 1968, 
0 0
SPACE, like ACMExii, specialised in short life buildings that are let out to artists . 
0
SPACE later developed a larger a portfolio of East End properties for artists studio 
0
space, first in houses and then in factory blocks (Green, 1999, 2001): it opened an 
0 0
office on the corner of Hoxton Square in 1990.
Another group of residents, the main residents in the Shoreditch triangle, were the 
small manufacturers (making buttons and engaged in specialised tailoring ). In 
0
contradistinction to residential gentrification theory, the proprietors of these 
businesses were not in the least upset to be moving on. First, the premises were too 
cramped for modern transport; second, the property values had risen such that the 
buildings were worth more than the businesses. Some of the proprieties had been 
letting out vacant  space to artists at this time; so, this was a natural transition to either 
sell up, or to relocate to outer London (Burwood, 2001). Those that sold up were often 
12
relieved to go, as button production, for example, had become significantly cheaper in 
0
China.
Thus, the narrative of ‘commercial or industrial gentrification’ may not be one of 
forcing out, but willing flight; clearly there are still conflicts of interest between artists 
and property developers and the tensions between use value and exchange valuexiii . 
0
These conflicts were further exacerbated by a relaxation of planning controls. Whilst 
Hackney’s strategy was at the time to retain light industry for the area, the visionaries 
were SPACE and organisations like them who sought to secure owner occupation for 
artist, so that they  had a sustainable future (Clark, 2001). In the face of laissez-faire 
UCO, only a not-for-profit developer like SPACE could intervene; in retrospect a new 
0
raft of (different) planning control might  have conceivably  slowed the artistic and new 
media rout and in so doing held on to production activities in the area. The case of the 
Lux exemplifies this issue; it was closed down due to rising rents. If public funding 
0
agencies had secured ownership of the property there is a good chance it would still 
be active.
Representation
Perhaps the defining moment for both ‘Cool Britannia’, Creative Britain, and Hoxton 
was a an article that appeared in the November 4th 1996 issue of the US periodical 
Time Magazine that sought to ‘dip into the creative melting pot that was Britain’. As 
others have noted, a major spur to this activity  was economic decline and the 
withdrawal of public sector funding for the arts ( McRobbie, 1999). Punk was one 
0
expression, one that was echoed across the arts, but critically and unwittingly funded 
by the new ‘Enterprise Allowance’ that sought to make Britain a country  of 
entrepreneurs. The Enterprise Allowance effectively gave young people a wage whilst 
they  set up a business or self-employment. Various cultural entrepreneurs seized the 
opportunity leading to a huge upsurge in DIY (Do it yourself) culture. 
Within weeks the notion of ‘Cool Britannia’ had been coined and traded on by British 
newspapers. The incoming New Labour government, just  six months later, sought to 
0
further exploit this notion for publicity  value and popularity (Pratt, 2005). The well 
0
publicised receptions at No10 Downing Street for pop stars and artists (Harris, 2003), 
the establishment of a ‘Department of Fun’ (DCMS), and the commissioning of 
reports on the economic contribution of the creative industries set the ‘mood music’ 
0
(DCMS, 1998). The Brit Art  and Brit Pop phenomena linked to a new projection of 
national self-confidence  were crowned by the plans for the Tate Modern Art Gallery 
0
(Leonard, 1997). One of the engine rooms of this process was Hoxton . Time Out’s 
0
1999 ‘hip  100, favourite faces and places’ ranked Hoxton No2, after fashion model 
Kate Moss (Graham, 2001). The Guardian’s A-Z of contemporary art simply had 
Hoxton as the ‘H’ entry. By  2000 insiders would say that it  was all over; symbolically 
in June that year the New Yorker magazine called Hoxton the ‘chicest place in the 
inhabited universe’; the Hackney Gazette’s take on this was that it was ‘So hip  it 
hurts’(Hagger, 2000).
13
As noted above, it was not long before the backlash began; in true Hoxton style much 
song and dance was made of it. A film, Low lifes and High Heels (2001), the 
Shoreditch Twatxiv magazine, and Chris Morris’s satirical TV series Nathan Barley 
(where ‘Shoreditch twat’ migrated into ‘Hoxton twat’), all sought to point a 
(knowing) finger at what the Shoreditch Twat called the ‘Marylebone tunnelers’. The 
‘tunnellers’ were what was seen as the invasion of ‘trustafarians’xv  and their like into 
the area as the artists and new media moved out; these incomers are characterised as 
0
frauds, liking to pontificate on the basis of no knowledge, and less sense, on all things 
cultural and digital (Harris, 2001).
This has led some to comment on the ‘cultural ambulance chasers’xvi in the same vein 
0
as gentrifiers. But, the point is that it is a process that can be enabled or constrained (if 
it is understood); different actors gain advantage at different stages. The argument of 
this paper is that if the process had been comprehended, then perhaps a more socially 
inclusive strategy might have been devised. 
The problem for policy makers, even if they understand the process, is that  the cycle 
happens so quickly and that the key generative agents do not have time to establish 
themselves (artists or new media producers in this case). What wins out is money, 
which as we can see is increasingly  focused on consumption and hence, to an extent, 
parasitic of the new creativity that has characterised Hoxton.  What is critical here is 
0
that some parts of the Hoxton area have improved economically, however there is a 
population deprived of work on its doorstep  that has received little or no benefit from 
0
this development at  all (Da Silva, 2001). Indeed, what jobs the ‘new’ Hoxton had 
provided were lost to the ‘old’ community as the new good jobs went to those who 
already had money and opportunity  for the most part, and invariably these workers 
came from outside the area. 
Creative class
Florida’s (2002) notion of the creative class is of a group attracted to a place by its 
0
consumption characteristics; it is this group  that, in turn, attracts hi-tech employers. 
Does this help us to understand Hoxton? Superficially, it does. However, as already 
0
noted the instrumental and consumption focus of Florida’s argument misses a number, 
of important processes related to production (see further discussion in Pratt, 2008).
0
One way or another Hoxton has always been a liminal space. From the prostitution, 
drinking and the establishment of England’s first Theatre, Hoxton has always been in 
the ‘entertainment industry’. What Hoxton had to offer was space and grime, and little 
0
regulation. At it turned out, this was precisely what the market wanted. In the recent 
period we can track the arrival of a number of punk music independent labels and 
studios in the 1980s. The early  the influx of artists into Hoxton in the early  1990 was 
more significant. This was not in itself new, artists had since the late 1960s been 
colonising east London (Green, 2001); significantly, Hoxton attracted a number of 
0
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artists who later became known as the YBA and attracted considerable critical and 
commercial success (Graham, 2001; Harris, 2001). The artists used the streets for 
experimental shows; they lived there, as did a number of the new Brit  pop artists such 
as Jarvis Cocker of the band Pulp.  In addition, fashion designers such as Alexander 
McQueen also had a studio here. The Blue Note (jazz) club was closed, but re-opened 
0
as the post-House, Blu Bar. Interestingly, the owner used to work for Stiff records, 
0 0
this became a venue for emergent Jungle artists such as Goldie.
This is not quite the ‘squeaky clean’ Florida version of the new consumption 
playground of the creative class. We can highlight a long duree of marginal and semi-
legal activities with little surveillance. Moreover, the critical contrast with the Florida 
model is that the creatives in Hoxton were producers and ‘real artists’ rather than 
consumers grazing on the latest trends in their lunch hours or weekends. Hoxton’s rise 
as a cultural powerhouse was in its phase as a producer rather than as a consumer.
The buzz attracted galleries and dealers in much the same way as it  had done in New 
0
York’s Soho (Zukin, 1982). Hot on the heels of the YBAs were the new media 
companies who sought a fusion of art and technology, along with an atmosphere of 
libertarian politics (New_Media_Knowledge, 1999). The presence of artists who 
courted ‘stardom’ along with Brit Pop, which sought to create a ‘sixties’ feel to 
London life, inevitably also drew in parties, bars and restaurants. Before long Hoxton 
was the place to be, and to be seen. The opening of the prestigious White Cube 
Gallery 2 cemented this reputation as new art space and the centre of coolxvii. By  this 
0 0
time property prices had exhausted the pockets of artists and as well as new media 
companies (who were suffering from a partial market restructuring post -2000). The 
final artists moved out of Hoxton Square in 2001 along with the last of the light 
manufacturing activities that had survived the 1970s (Burwood, 2001; Graham, 2001). 
The symbolic transition was the closure of the Lux cinema. 
The Lux was a gallery and studio opened in 1997 that also was a home to the London 
Film and Video Cooperative (LFVC), and a Cinema. The cinema showed a very  left-
field rage of art cinema and talks; the LFVC ran a number of innovative new media 
training projects that yielded world-beating techniques and artists. The gallery served 
as showcase and the coffee bar a focus. On many occasions the gallery spilled out into 
the square with visual projections on buildings and installations in the park; a perfect 
expression of modernism. The Lux was a leased building, and funded - in part  - 
however, the Arts Council and the Film Council withdrew key funding in 2001 and 
the Lux was forced to close. This unwitting act  helped to unravel  cultural production 
0 0 00
in Hoxton and prepared the way for its new role as an antiseptic consumption space. 
The majority  of the properties in the Square were converted into residential, or rebuilt 
0
as residential, accommodation, and new were restaurants opened up.
Global cities and APS
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If we assume that new media is an advanced producer service then we would expect it 
to be engaged in a large proportion of international trade, and to have little linkage 
with local firms. The interviews that we have carried out suggest that whilst there is 
an international presence, trade is mainly  national; this is echoed by the structure of 
both the new media and advertising industries. However, it  might be that financial 
institutions were outsourcing new media and thus trade would be expected to be 
0
spatially  tightly-focused. This hypothesis has been suggested to explain the growth of 
0 0
new media in Hoxton and the wider City Fringe (Gordon and McCann, 2000), contra 
0
the partial survey of O’Sullivan (2002), there is little evidence to support this; our 
survey generated quite the opposite perspective: new media companies in Hoxton 
have little or no connection with the City in terms of their business activities. It is true 
to say that whilst physically close they  operate in quite different social and economic 
worlds (this argument is developed in detail in Pratt, 2007).
Thus, whilst we could continue to debate the definition of APS and the role of new 
media (where it is a exception), it  certainly does not fit  the expected norm of  an APS 
0
through a linkage to the financial services. Instead, the linkage is with film, TV and 
advertising. Moreover, the local networks of operatives and principals seems critical 
to the sustenance of an elite ‘reputation economy’ based upon face to face interactions 
and long term work associations. The relationship between new media and the City, 
and that of APS and the cultural sector more generally, is an important sub-theme 
here. We have examined this is more detail elsewhere (Pratt, 2007). In summary, 
artists’ production networks and new media production networks where not focused 
on the City  but on the wider British art scene, music, animation, film, TV and the 
advertising industry. As prices rose, artistic and new media producers were forced out 
and replaced by consumer residents, many  of who worked in the City  (in this sense an 




Without  doubt the art galleries and bars of Hoxton have become a consumption 
cluster; the question is, has this delivered the regeneration effect, or killed it off? The 
positive expectation of business clusters in the city has been based upon the potential 
minimization of transfer costs. On one hand, in respect to the movement of goods, this 
is a minor factor in respect to new and old media, on the other hand, with regard to 
labour markets and labour pooling, as well as knowledge and reputation (Grabher, 
2001a; Pratt, 2006) localised social and economic effects may be amplified. 
0
It is this complex web of social and economic networks that  seems to offer the most 
0
convincing account of Hoxton’s development. The social networks that embedded 
Hoxton in London and beyond, and became embedded in  Hoxton, were not  self-
0
generated but  migrated towards it. Perhaps the two most influential institutions were 
the Royal College of Art (RCA) and Goldsmiths College, neither of which is close to 
Hoxton (Harris, 2001). However, the artists from these institutions were looking for 
studio space, and a place to live. Goldsmiths is easily accessible via the East London 
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line; and, access to Kensington (RCA)  is easy  from the City. However, commuting 
0
was not the issue, a studio and a critical community was. For these artists a key 
gallery was the Whitechapel, which was close by, where Nicholas Serota, the future 
Tate Modern curator, was located. However, in that part of East London a whole 
network of ‘art factories’ had sprung up (Green, 2001). Artists were seeking to 
support themselves and at an early stage in their careers where experimentalism is all. 
The YBAs in particular experienced a career more like pop  music stars being 
championed, and bought, by dealers and collectors such as Charles Saatchi.
A key personality was Joshua Compston who opened his Factual Nonsense gallery  – 
the first in Hoxton - in Charlotte Street in 1992. Compston organised a number of 
street fairs entitled A fete worse than death, that populated both Charlotte Street and 
Hoxton Square with art (Harris, 2001). Critically, Crompston sought to ‘exploit and 
eventually explode the gap between art, advertising and entertainment, high street 
retailing and real estate development’ (Stallabrass, 1999 page 185). Compston died in 
1996, symbolically marking the beginning of the end of Hoxton idealism.
0
Interestingly, several of the new media people that we spoke to also had a history in 
the RCA. This was the case of one of the founders of what became a hugely 
successful, perhaps at the time the UKs premier new media company in the country: 
DeepEnd. DeepEnd had a complex and flat organisational structure and spawned a 
number of project groups: DeepGroups. In 2000 the company  failed; however, a large 
number of the key players in new media, especially those link to advertising, can trace 
a history to either DeepEnd, or Hoxton. By  the early 2000’s Hoxton had moved from 
a sign of the ‘edgiest’, ‘inventive’ and ‘creative’, to a ‘bunch of posers’, New media 
companies suggested that to locate there was to undermine business confidence (such 
was the hype circulating about the new media crash). Alongside DeepEnd there were 
a number of other key innovators in the London new media scene, many of which 
took a less commercial and more ‘art’ related route such as Soda and MetaMute.
The development of new media was both a London and a local phenomena, the 
development of which drew in filmmakers and artists. The first phase of new media 
0
activity was characterised by a large number of innovative companies that had a social 
and sometimes activist agenda as well as a financial one. These companies developed 
as a social network sharing resources as well as competing for work first in web 
design, and later on the fringes of advertising. After the market crash of 2000, many 
companies fragmented but re-emerged in different forms; notably more closely allied 
to, or as subsidiaries of, advertisers. The second wave of new media growth has been 
more closely associated with advertising and in part this has drawn the centre of 
gravity to Clerkenwell. In addition a second wave of more financially  orientated 
companies has developed. The advertising industry, even the on-line advertising 
industry, is almost exclusively  nationally based in their operations and contracts 




Some big claims have been made for the role of culture in relation to urban 
regeneration, likewise there is a growing expectation that the cultural economy may 
play  a critical role in the urban economy. The elision of these two aspirations is 
understandable, but risky. In this paper we have sought to take a cautious and critical 
0
approach to assumptions and hypotheses about the role of culture in cities. We have 
0
argued that such a sceptical approach is all the more justified as cultural strategies are 
0
the current ‘flavour of the moment’ the world over. Clearly, given the expectations 
loaded on culture and the cultural economy it is important that we fully comprehend 
and understand the processes involved, and what, if anything, can be done to shape 
them. The suggestion is that we do not understand what is going on so far, and that 
standardised explanations of agglomeration or place marketing miss the point. This 
paper is a challenge to such accounts.
This paper has sought to find a fine balance between providing empirical detail and 
generalisation. The paper has highlighted the need to consider cultural production as 
well as consumption; and, the specific role that cultural production may play at some 
times in particular urban settings. Rather than falling back on the simple dualism of 
production and consumption the paper does point to the re-cursive formation of both 
in situ; a notion that habitus captures. Whereas habitus is commonly used to refer to 
residential gentrification, here we noted that it had the potential to provide insight into 
cultural production.
Richard Florida’s (2002) book has perhaps extended the life of place competition 
strategies. It  is important to point  out that whatever other benefits such strategies 
have, they are based upon an instrumental use of culture, and on consumption 
strategies alone. As such, logically, it  would be inappropriate to expect regeneration of 
0
production as a result. As Mommaas (2004) points out, the field of cultural clusters is 
0
already confused.  Florida’s notion confuses it more; however, as with cultural 
0
clusters, creative cities /classes  either function as competition strategies based upon 
0 00
the promotion of elite, consumption, or heritage sites, or both.
0
To take another tack on the creative class debate, the failure to adequately  analyse 
class micro-structuration is gap in Florida’s work. As noted in this paper the subtle 
differentiation of cool/not cool, and authentic/fraud is a fine line, one that is further 
intensified by the distinction between production and consumption. The point being 
that it is very difficult to unproblematically identify  a single ‘creative class’ when 
such social and cultural ‘trench warfare’ is going on; again, it is a theme that should 
be acknowledged and explored in future work on such clusters.
Positioned against these popular conceptions and the strategies derived from them are 
0 0
a new set of policies that are often confused with them, but which draw upon a 
different logic: those based upon cultural production. Just  as cultural consumption is 
growing, so is cultural production; in fact  it is one of the growth areas of the economy 
( DCMS, 1998). The question is, how is such growth harnessed for, and 
0
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accommodated in, the city? This paper represents an attempt to engage in this debate 
for the position of understanding the processes. In this sense it may act as a call for a 
reconsideration of culture and its productive, as well as consumptive, modes of 
analysis and policy consideration.
The main conclusion from this paper is that in the case of Hoxton neither existing 
policies, nor explanations, have generated very satisfactory explanation of practice, or 
guidance for action. In fact, our analysis has pointed to examples of a number of ways 
0
in which – if it had been understood at the time – cultural production might have been 
assisted. The paper reviewed six key arguments that were put forward to ‘explain’ the 
0
growth of the cultural economy  in cities. When tested against the available evidence 
0
from Hoxton, much of what is argued in these accounts is found wanting. The laissez-
faire, ‘do nothing’, approach is not credible  as there are clearly  so many institutional 
0
factors at play; moreover, the expected multiplier or spill over effects simply did not 
0
materialise. The gentrification approach  was found to be partial, especially as most 
0
scholarship  has focused on residential, not industrial, gentrification. The findings here 
were suggestive of the fact that industrial gentrification may have a different set  of 
dynamics; however, we found some concurrence with Zukin’s (1982) argument about 
0
the role of habitus, artists and developers.
Third, the role of representation was noted as extremely significant  in Hoxton, in fact 
it might be argued that Hoxton was a place marketer’s dream. The analysis shows that 
0
d espite international publicity marketing does not sustain development, especially 
0 0
when t hat development is rooted in consumption. Moreover, the Hoxton case also 
0
revealed the two edged sword that publicity is, and evidence of a ‘backlash’ that 
adversely affected the area. The paper did examine whether a ‘creative class’ (in 
Florida’s terms) could account for Hoxton’s rise in fortunes. Again, the empirical 
0
evidence did not sustain the idea; in fact, what emerged was that the social production 
networks of artists and new media workers was critical. Finally, the argument that 
cultural industries , as a sub-section of the APS, were dependent upon the financial 
0
services of the City was noted; interviewees were able to give such a notion little 
0
support.
Where does this leave us? Clearly, representations of cities are important, however the 
literature seldom looks at the downside, the backlash, or the resistance to such 
strategies. In the Hoxton case, the mix was particularly complex. This was 
exacerbated by  the fact that the representation, and the struggles over it, were an 
epiphenomena of a range of other conflicts between production and consumption, 
originality and ‘fraudulence’.  This case study has opened up a number of conceptual 
assumptions about the relationship between culture and cities, it has highlighted that 
cultural production may play a generative role, also that there is a complex process of 
industrial gentrification that would repay further examination.
Clearly, this paper is only an exploratory  account of these issues; it is not a result  that 
can be simply generalised. It may be that Hoxton is a one off, although there do seem 
to be a number of similar quarters in cities around the world (see for example Lloyd 
19
2006). Rather than caliming exceptionalism, or a new model, the point that has been 
0
made is the  need to pay more attention to the complex processes of cultural 
0
production in cities; and, to the social networks that sustain them. Furthermore, more 
0
exploration of the potential role that policy makers might play in shaping these 
industries is needed. However, as noted above, simple identification of the industries 
and activities is a first priority, quickly  followed by the need for a deeper 
understanding of the operation of the cultural industries. Associated with this, the 
paper has highlighted the value of taking a longer term examination of culture in 
cities; it is evident that the roots of Hoxton run deep in history, and far across London. 
Above all this study has highlighted the need to attend to the complexities of socio-
economic-cultural action: in and across firms, between formal and informal activities, 
between art and commerce, and between public and private sectors. Further research 
on these topics, grounded in empirical studies, is urgently  required if we are to fully 
understand the emergent neo-industrial city.
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Endnotes
i For example, the Northern Quarter, Manchester, the Lace Market, Nottingham, the 
Jewellery Quarter, Birmingham, and The Lanes, Brighton.
ii The classic dichotomy in arts policy is between inclusion and excellence. The 
cultural policy dilemma is between cultural excellence and profit. These do not have 
to be dualisms, but they commonly are.
iii ESRC, and the Arts Council of England.
iv E-society project: e-clusters in an e-society? Ref: RES 314-25-005
v An early form of voluntary social housing financed by the Peabody Trust.
vi Notorious ‘gangland’ bosses.
vii The fact that these minor inflections of irony and culture were projected onto a 
national and international stage is evidence of the ‘reach’ of the cultural 
transformation (and backlash) that was represented by Hoxton.
viii Clearly, there is scope to focus a research project entirely on the mobilisation of 
habitus as Zukin suggests. However, that might be a fruitful focus for future 
researchers with more substantial resources to support an extensive ethnographic 
research programme.
ix This section draws upon empirical material from Harris (2001)
x Other development companies later became involved, for example, The Manhattan 
Loft Company.
xi For example, the Custard Factory in Birmingham, or the Truman Brewery in Brick 
Lane, London.
xii A similar agency set up later.
xiii Although not part of the main narrative in this paper, there is clearly a need for 
more research into the phenomenon of industrial gentrification.
xiv The term ‘twat’ is an obscene term of abuse but used to indicate dismissivness and 
disdain for the victim. The reference to Marylebone  (a rich, trendy and exclusive 
shopping area of North London) is that the rich youth are accused of ‘slumming it’ in 
Hoxton, gaining access to Hoxton through money not artistic merit.
xv ‘Trustafarians’: Upper middle class people who do not have to work for a living, 
being supported by parental trust funds, so that they can ‘dabble’ in culture. The claim 
is that it was money not talent that enabled the art practice; and, for the critics, it was 
also the lack of authenticity of their work and action (a strangely Adorno-like 
statement for such post-modern times!) that led to them being subjected to derision. It 
is also a claim that this group were ‘fellow travellers’ rather than ‘originals’ (the local 
term is ‘cultural, ambulance chasers’; echoing the critique of some legal professionals 
who prey on the small claims of the poor, who are also termed ambulance chasers).
xvi See previous endnote.
xvii The opening was a major media and (film and music) star-studded event.
